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TWO CHEERS FOR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
GEORGE THOMAS*
The sentiment that the Constitution needs to be radically altered
to keep up with the times is by now a fairly old one.  It originated in
the early years of the twentieth century when progressives insisted that
the Constitution should be viewed in Darwinian terms to allow for its
adaptation to the “opinion of the age.”1  This notion of adaptation or
evolution rejected the idea of a fixed constitution.  Whether it was our
inherited understanding of liberty or constitutional forms such as the
separation of powers, we would have to adapt these to meet the needs
of political development.2  While progressive arguments combined
pragmatic and evolutionary justifications, both strands of thought
tended to reject the notion of permanent constitutional foundations.3
Thus, progressives were often dismissive of fixed constitutional rights
and limits as relics of eighteenth-century thought that needed to be
reconstructed to bring our government into accord with the flow of
history.4  In Woodrow Wilson’s words, a “[l]iving constitution[ ] must
be Darwinian in structure and in practice,” as “[n]o living thing can
have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the
contrary, its life is dependent upon their quick cooperation, their
ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence, their ami-
cable community of purpose.”5
Copyright  2007 by George Thomas.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College and the author of The
Madisonian Constitution (forthcoming, Johns Hopkins University Press).
1. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56, 172
(1908).
2. See generally HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY (Transaction Pub. 1998)
(1914).
3. See Sidney A. Pearson, Jr., Introduction to CROLY, supra note 2, at xxvii (stating that R
progressives such as Croly viewed the Constitution as a “‘living Constitution,’ which is to
say that it was not bound by the principles of the Founders”); WILSON, supra note 1, at 4 R
(arguing that “[t]he ideals of liberty cannot be fixed from generation to generation”). For
a critique of such views, see GARY J. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SU-
PREME COURT 17 (1977) (arguing that the “statesmanlike judge will adapt the Constitution
to changing social realities without altering the meaning of the document”).
4. See JAMES W. CEASER, NATURE AND HISTORY IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
62–63 (2006) (stating that “[t]o honor the Constitution was to enslave one’s mind and
submit to an ancient authority”).
5. WILSON, supra note 1, at 56–57. R
222
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Subsequent calls for constitutional reform have often born a
heavy debt to the progressives, and Wilson in particular. Consider the
American Political Science Association report on responsible party
government,6 James MacGregor Burns’ call for a parliamentary gov-
ernment,7 Robert Dahl’s insistence on “polyarchy,”8 and the Commit-
tee on the Constitutional System’s desire to bring cabinet government
into the fold of our constitutional system.9  All follow in Wilson’s foot-
steps, seeking to alter or overcome elements of America’s written Con-
stitution—particularly its embrace of the separation of powers and
checks and balances—to bring it in line with modern governance.
Professor Sanford Levinson’s book, Our Undemocratic Constitution, is
partly in this vein, but only partly.10  I take him seriously when he
claims to be a kindred spirit with the Founders, who themselves were
cosmopolitan in outlook and insisted on “learning from experience”
in creating a constitution to suit their needs.11  This insistence runs
throughout The Federalist.  Moreover, in defending the Constitution,
The Federalist speaks of “aptitude and tendency,”12 or in the language
of modern political science, probability, not certainty, recognizing
that the Constitution is an imperfect experiment.13  This recognition
led James Madison to be much less sanguine about maintaining con-
stitutional government than Wilson,14 whose Constitutional Government
reads as an extended quarrel with Madison.  While Wilson would insist
that “[g]overnment is not a body of blind forces; it is a body of men,”
6. American Political Science Association, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A
Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (Supp. 1950).
7. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY 327–30 (1963).
8. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 63–89 (1956).
9. REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE BICENTENNIAL PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 185 (Donald Robinson ed., 1985).  Much recent scholar-
ship, however, has criticized the Wilsonian view of the separation of powers. See, e.g., JO-
SEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 196 (1994) (illustrating how the separation of powers can foster
responsible and deliberative government contrary to Wilson’s understanding); JESSICA
KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH OF THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO (1996) (analyzing the legislative veto to uncover the disadvantages of the
Wilsonian enthusiasm for relaxing separation of powers principles in decision making);
DANIEL D. STID, THE PRESIDENT AS STATESMAN (1998) (analyzing the Wilsonian Presidency
and its effect on American policy-making).
10. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
11. Id. at 15.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 382 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
13. Id. NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 41 (James Madison).
14. Id. NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).  Even Brutus, arguing against the Constitution,
said we cannot strive for perfection, as even those urging ratification of this Constitution
admit it is imperfect.  Brutus, To the Citizens of the State of New York (1787), reprinted in THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 108 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
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this was, pace Wilson, precisely what underpinned Madison’s constitu-
tionalism.15  That is, Madison’s constitutionalism was based on the les-
sons of history and experience, not the ingenious musings of a
theorist planning a constitution from the closet of his imagination.16
In the first section of this Essay, I suggest that the history and
experience of American constitutionalism make it difficult to think of
our Constitution as an eighteenth-century constitution.  Yet, even so,
if I found myself at Levinson’s constitutional convention,17 I would
caution against a progressive view of constitutional development that
seeks to dissolve the essentials of eighteenth-century constitutionalism
in favor of twenty-first century imperatives.  All the more so as the cen-
tral competitors to eighteenth-century constitutionalism, even in the
early years of the twenty-first century, are rooted in variants of eight-
eenth-century thought, whether it is Rousseau’s eighteenth-century
democracy,18 Kant’s eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism,19 or
Hegel’s eighteenth-century history (if we think of it as the “long”
eighteenth century).20  Thus, in the second section of this Essay, I con-
sider those elements of eighteenth-century constitutionalism that our
Constitution embraces and, I think, should be foundational to any
new form of government we create in the twenty-first century.  Yet, in
the spirit of eighteenth-century constitutionalism itself, let me give it
15. WILSON, supra note 1, at 56. R
16. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 12 (analyzing the merits of R
the Constitution against the historical context of its framing).
17. LEVINSON, supra note 10. R
18. We see this reliance on eighteenth-century thought most evidently in the work of
popular constitutionalists such as BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991) (arguing that American constitutionalism is a dualist democracy which is explicitly
anti-foundationalist and allows the people, in unconventional acts, to transform the Consti-
tution in unlimited ways). See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 51 (2004) (arguing that the Constitution should
be understood as “a layman’s instrument of government,” as “the people” want it to be
understood).  These scholars have written, often brilliantly, on constitutional development
and the problems of constitutional enforcement.  But, in the end, they all advocate some
form of popular sovereignty which can easily trump the written Constitution. For a more
extensive critique of popular constitutionalism, see George Thomas, Popular Constitutional-
ism: The New Living Constitutionalism, STUD. IN LAW, POLS. & SOC’Y (forthcoming).
19. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)
(defending moral judgments from the judiciary as essential to constitutional self-govern-
ment); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004) (argu-
ing that in a democracy we must offer “mutually acceptable reasons” for the laws we enact).
20. Constitutional scholars’ reliance on Hegel’s philosophy of history is captured by
the progressive view that history moves in a direction and, therefore, requires us to adapt
with it. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 57 (stating that the “definitions and prescriptions of . . . R
constitutional law . . . are sufficiently broad and elastic to allow for the play of life and
circumstance”).
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two cheers, withholding the third cheer in recognition that a more
appealing alternative might come along.
An Eighteenth-Century Constitution?
Because the Constitution does not speak for itself, if not properly
contrived, as argued in Federalist No. 48, the Constitution might be-
come “a mere demarcation on parchment.”21  Yet to vest authority in
any one body to “speak” for the fundamental law is effectively to make
that body sovereign.22  Thus, the purposeful division of power within
the Constitution is based on a refusal to vest sovereign authority in any
single body—including in the people themselves, even if the Constitu-
tion implicitly recognizes their revolutionary right to alter or abolish
the Constitution.23  The very diffusion of sovereign authority—what
Aristotle called the distribution of offices—speaks to the fundamental
nature of the polity: it is neither “democratic” nor “undemocratic.”24
Rather, the Constitution is a complex and skillfully contrived blend of
liberalism and democracy characterized by tension.25  This is evident
insofar as natural rights and popular sovereignty both provide the
foundation of our Constitution.26  In this way, American constitution-
alism is ordered around agonistic institutions and principles.
The ineluctable result of this, so much at the heart of eighteenth-
century constitutionalism, is to make the Constitution “resistant as a
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 276. R
22. See George Thomas, Recovering the Political Constitution: The Madisonian Vision, 66
REV. POL. 233 (2004) (proposing a reexamination of the supremacy the Supreme Court
holds because of its status as sole interpreter of the Constitution).
23. Madison would have put this as a preface to the Constitution along with the Bill of
Rights, making this sentiment textually explicit.  Even so, the people, arguably, would be
bound by natural rights and reason, and thus not sovereign in a Rousseauian sense. See
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 170
(Susan Dunn ed., 2002) (arguing that the sovereign is simply the general will of all citizens,
which should be exercised absent any representative intermediaries).
24. Compare NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004) (pos-
iting that changes in constitutional interpretation—and, thus, the law itself—are reflective
of the will of the populace, demonstrating the democratic nature of the system), with LEV-
INSON, supra note 10 (posing arguments against the inherent democratic nature of the U.S. R
Constitution).
25. See generally THE FEDERALIST, supra note 12. See also JAMES W. CEASER, LIBERAL DE- R
MOCRACY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 8 (1990) (discussing liberal democracy as a “fusion of two
government principles”); Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 3, 6–7 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (dis-
cussing liberal democracy, or constitutional democracy, as a compound form of
government).
26. See GEORGE THOMAS, THE MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming); see also
THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVER-
EIGNTY (2000) (analyzing the role of natural rights theory and ideas of popular sovereignty
in the drafting of the Ninth Amendment).
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whole to any sustained settlement of the kind that either a demagogue
or a sovereign authoritative point of view might try to impose.”27  But
this has also meant that the Constitution rarely finds coherent expres-
sion as a whole.28  Rather, attempts to construct and reconstruct con-
stitutional authority and meaning have been the historic norm.29  We
might characterize these attempts as an interaction between America’s
small “c” constitution, which has aptly been described as America’s
constitutional soul, and our large “C” formal constitution.30  To be
sure, debates about constitutional ideas are historically rooted in
struggles to justify particular policies and political projects.31  But they
also illuminate what it means to bring the Constitution to life.32
These ideas, moreover, have shaped how we think and speak about
the Constitution, even while the Constitution shapes the horizon in
which such political struggles take place.33
As a polity, if we have a sort of constitutional faith, we have dis-
agreed profoundly about constitutional meaning and authority, en-
gaging in conflicted struggles over the proper ordering of
constitutional values.34  Many of these constitutional reconstructions
27. BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION 208 (2006); see also WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1996) (arguing that multiple perspectives
on constitutional meaning may exist outside of official constitutional channels).  This
point was vividly brought home by Madison in a letter to Jefferson in which he insisted that
these political devices for maintaining the Constitution might fail: “these mechanisms ‘are
neither the sole nor the chief palladium of constitutional liberty.  The people, who are the
authors of this blessing, must also be its guardians.’” LANCE BANNING, JEFFERSON AND
MADISON 21 (1995).
28. Thomas, supra note 22 (arguing that the Constitution is inherently unsettled and R
under continual debate); see also MOORE, supra note 27, at 3 (“The law of the land is richly R
textured, not capable of being reduced to either-or propositions.”).
29. See generally KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES (2004) (cataloguing in-
stances of the construction and reconstruction of civil rights and civil liberties in American
constitutional development). See also Wayne D. Moore, (Re)Construction of Constitutional Au-
thority and Meaning: The Fourteenth Amendment and Slaughter-House Cases, in THE SUPREME
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 229, 229 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch
eds., 2006) (stating that “a good way to study important problems of constitutional devel-
opment is through analysis of the construction and reconstruction of constitutional au-
thority and meaning”).
30. See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL (1991), for a col-
lection of essays on the nature of American constitutionalism.
31. See KERSCH, supra note 29 (tracing constitutional developments and the historical R
contexts of those developments); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDI-
CIAL SUPREMACY 1 (2007).
32. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION] (arguing that constitutional constructions by the political
branches have been essential to American constitutional development).
33. Id. at 1.
34. See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2007) (discussing
the range of values that may be adopted in constitutional construction).
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depart significantly from our eighteenth-century Constitution, for ex-
ample, the near erasure of the Ninth Amendment,35 or in how we
elect presidents.36  Others, such as political parties, may go against
original visions but are consistent with original ends.37  Yet attempts to
construct or reconstruct constitutional meaning and authority are fre-
quently arguments over precisely what constitutional ends require.
Even those statesmen who have been thought to radically alter the
Founders’ Constitution often insisted that they were simply adapting
constitutional meaning and authority to original ends.  In this spirit,
Franklin D. Roosevelt frequently cast himself as adhering to the sub-
stantive ends of the Constitution, even while viewing constitutional
forms as instrumental and, therefore, adaptable in the pursuit of foun-
dational ends.38  Erstwhile New Dealers like Robert Jackson and Felix
Frankfurter often insisted that the New Deal flowed from the
Founder’s constitutional commitments in this manner, which would
make the New Deal a constitutional “restoration” rather than a consti-
tutional “revolution.”39  Such an understanding might even plausibly
be manifest in Justice Cardozo’s attempt to capture the spirit of the
Founders: “It is not in my judgment inconsistent with what they [the
Founders] would say today nor with what today they would believe, if
they were called upon to interpret ‘in the light of our whole experi-
ence’ the constitution that they framed for the needs of an expanding
future . . . .”40  This is quite different from a “living” constitution that
rejects foundations in favor of historical evolution.
35. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY 252 (2004).
36. See JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 1 (1979) (noting that the method of
presidential selection has undergone several alterations since the Framing of the Constitu-
tion) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION].
37. Id. at 37–38.
38. For such a view, see SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 92 (2003)
[hereinafter WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION]. See also Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Two Constitu-
tional Presidencies, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 57 (Michael Nelson ed., 8th
ed. 2006) (situating the New Deal as a legitimate outgrowth of the arguments in The Feder-
alist).  Woodrow Wilson, in portions of Constitutional Government, might even be seen in this
light. See WILSON, supra note 1. R
39. See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional
Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 73–74 (2002) (discussing Roosevelt’s “Court-pack-
ing proposal” as a constitutionalization of New Deal reforms).  For an examination of the
New Deal as a legitimate revolution, see ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS,
supra note 18, at 279. R
40. Unpublished concurring opinion of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo in Home Building
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), reprinted in WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 136, 138 (1986).
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Yet FDR also drew deeply on historical adaptation—perhaps even
rejecting foundational ends.41  This sentiment is characterized by
Frankfurter’s insistence, nurturing three decades of progressive
thought, that “the Constitution of the United States is most signifi-
cantly not a document but a stream of history.”42  Or Cardozo’s insis-
tence “that the juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the
philosophy of pragmatism.  Its truth is relative, not absolute.”43  This
was surely true of the progressive insistence on “pure democracy,”
which would require a profound reconstruction of constitutional lib-
erty as well as an alteration, if not abandonment, of our formal consti-
tutional structures, in favor not just of history, but History.44  As
Wilson put it: “Governments are living things and operate as organic
wholes.  Moreover, governments have their natural evolution and are
one thing in one age, another in another.”45  In The New Freedom, Wil-
son explains this as a necessarily progressive venture: “Progress, devel-
opment,—those are modern words.  The modern idea is to leave the
past and press onward to something new.”46  For Wilson, our under-
standing of liberty and constitutional structure must evolve—or de-
velop—with large-scale historical change.47
There is perhaps an understandable temptation to dispense with
constitutional forms in favor of grander and nobler constitutional
ends—particularly given changing historical circumstances.  We
might read the preamble to the Constitution for inspiration, as does
Professor Levinson, as it calls us to “establish Justice” and “secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”48  We would be
hard pressed to find such inspiration in the mundane technicality of
Article I.49  Or, even for those swept away by the image of the Court as
great defender of individual liberty, to find it in Article III, Section 2:
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, aris-
41. As Roosevelt argued, at times our task was “building anew on the Constitution ‘a
system of living law,’” which turned on an evolving consensus, not foundational ends. KE-
VIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE 71 (2004); see also GARY J. JACOB-
SOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION 37 (1986)
(discussing the “Transvaluation of Liberal Constitutionalism” that legal realism entails).
42. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 2
(1937).
43. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102 (1963).
44. CEASER, supra note 4, at 7, 65.  Ceaser distinguishes History (with a capital “H”) R
from history (with a small “h”) by noting that History refers to “temporal accounts that are
designed to establish a fundamental purpose or standard of right.” Id. at 7.
45. WILSON, supra note 1, at 54. R
46. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 42 (1913).
47. Id. at 33–54.
48. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
49. Id. art. I.
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ing under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”50
Demands for justice and efficiency, articulated to some degree in the
Constitution’s preamble, are often behind the insistence on dramatic
constitutional change aimed at bringing the Constitution up to date
by making it more democratic or more effective.51  But we should no-
tice that James Madison viewed complex constitutional forms as a
means of achieving justice.52  Recall that in his most famous discussion
of the separation of powers in Federalist No. 51, Madison concludes his
exposition on the virtues of the separation of powers by attaching it to
the sentiment that “[j]ustice is the end of government.”53  This is
brought more vividly to light in a subsequent sentence: “It [justice]
ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until
liberty be lost in the pursuit.”54  The point is that justice might be best
achieved by preventing quick or authoritative action under the Consti-
tution, particularly such action done in the name of justice.  The sepa-
ration of powers can be both a means and an ends: a means in
preventing “usurp[ations],” an end in promoting “sober delibera-
tion”55 about the ends the Constitution aspires toward.  Perhaps the
Constitution is no longer fostering and sustaining its substantive com-
mitments.56  Perhaps those commitments are relics of the eighteenth
century.57  But we should be wary of constitutional change as an im-
perative of History.58  As Ken Kersch describes it, this Whiggish narra-
tive of development involves erasures that gloss over the agonistic and
conflicted struggle between “liberties and liberties” and “rights and
rights” that were central to forging the institutions of the “New Ameri-
can State.”59  Thus, rights and liberties long protected within the
terms of traditional American constitutionalism were, in accord with
the progressive imperative of state-building as History, said to be no
longer rights.
Yet I am open to the possibility that constitutional meaning is
forged in the historical interaction between general constitutional
50. Id. art. III, § 2.
51. WILSON, supra note 1, at 56–57. R
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12. R
53. Id. at 292.
54. Id.
55. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 178 (1984).
56. WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, at 118. R
57. WILSON, supra note 1, at 56; see also CROLY, supra note 2, at 51 (discussing the Con- R
stitution as “the work of a democracy which wholly failed to understand the proper relation
between popular political power and popular economic and social policy”).
58. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
59. KERSCH, supra note 29, at 25–26. R
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principles and particular political and historical circumstances.  This
is not to say that whatever comes out of our historical debates is consti-
tutional meaning—that is the Constitution as history.  Nor is it to say
that whatever meaning comes out of these great debates reveals to us
the true nature of our Constitution—that is the Constitution as His-
tory.  Rather, it is to offer a more tentative suggestion that confronted
with particular historical circumstances, we are forced to wrestle with
constitutional identity at its most foundational level.  While new cir-
cumstances have often led us to develop constitutional meaning, not
every such reconstruction is constitutionally grounded.60  Constitu-
tional meaning is not infinitely malleable; the Constitution is not a
mere framework the substance of which we may alter with ever-new
constructions.61  Yet the attempts to construct or reconstruct constitu-
tional meaning and authority that I briefly canvassed above were fre-
quently arguments over precisely what constitutional ends require.62
And such debates shaped how we see the Constitution, giving us a
layered “text-polity” where recent constructions overlay and often con-
flict with earlier constructions.63  Thus our eighteenth-century Consti-
tution is overlain with nineteenth- and twentieth-century
understandings that can both complement and conflict with it.64  In
looking at this interaction of constitutional continuity and change it is
difficult to speak of ours as an eighteenth-century Constitution.  At
the same time, I think there are lessons from the eighteenth century
that remain relevant.
The Lessons of Eighteenth-Century Constitutionalism
At the root of the modern constitutionalism embraced by our
Constitution is the insistence on substantive limits to governmental
power.65  Thus, even in a revolutionary act where the people alter or
abolish a constitution and create a new form of government, they are
limited in the reach of their power.66  Recall that the Declaration of
Independence itself, that great act of a revolutionary people, spoke of
60. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1999); see also CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 32, at 4–5 (describing construction as involving con- R
siderations outside the constitutional text itself).
61. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 32, at 6 (stating that “tools of inter- R
pretation . . . are meant to illuminate the text, not to alter or add to it”).
62. See generally Thomas, supra note 22. R
63. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 17 (1987).
64. Id.
65. MURPHY, supra note 34, at 10 (noting that constitutional democracy entails limits on R
governmental power).
66. Id. at 10–11.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR113.txt unknown Seq: 10 11-DEC-07 13:58
2007]TWO CHEERS FOR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTIONALISM231
our Constitution in these terms.67  If popular sovereignty is one facet
of the American amalgam (unlike Rousseau’s version, which is “noth-
ing but the exercise of the general will”), it has bounds.68  The Ameri-
can Revolution was justified not simply because American sovereignty
was being denied, “altering fundamentally the Forms of our Govern-
ments,” but because “whenever any Form of Government becomes de-
structive of [its] ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it . . . .”69  This revolutionary right is rooted in the natural
rights of human beings, and to “secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men . . . .”70  There is, then, a limit to what consent
by way of popular sovereignty can legitimately achieve.71  This is evi-
dent in the thoughts of James Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and James
Madison—three of the Founders whose writings are relied on most
frequently to justify popular sovereignty as trumping constitutional
provisions.72  Interestingly, however, these thinkers often insisted that
even absent the Constitution, in revolutionary rather than constitu-
tional terms, the people are bound.
In his first lecture on jurisprudence, James Wilson insisted that
“revolution principles” ought to be taught “as a principle for the con-
stitution of the United States,”73 and during the ratifying conventions
he insisted that, “the truth is, that the supreme, absolute and uncon-
trollable authority, remains with the people.”74  Yet Wilson insisted that
this point should legitimize the act of creating a new constitution
based on the popular authority of the people, not the states.  Indeed,
at the end of his speech he insisted that the Declaration of Indepen-
67. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776) (listing as a grievance
against George III, “He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to
our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their acts of pre-
tended Legislation”).
68. ROUSSEAU, supra note 23, at 170. R
69. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 22.
70. Id. para. 2.
71. MURPHY, supra note 34, at 516. R
72. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RE-
SPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 89, 114–15 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (discussing and con-
trasting Wilson’s and Madison’s ideas about popular sovereignty); see also ACKERMAN, supra
note 18 (arguing that the Constitution embraces an anti-foundationalist “dualist democ- R
racy” where the people, acting as the people, are unbound).
73. JAMES WILSON, LECTURES ON LAW DELIVERED IN THE COLLEGE OF PHILADELPHIA
(1790), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 69, 78–79 (Robert Green McCloskey ed.,
1967).
74. JAMES WILSON, PENNSYLVANIA RATIFYING CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 61, 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).  For a
discussion of Wilson suggesting his endorsement of unqualified popular sovereignty, see
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 297 (2005).
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dence recognized this unalienable right of the people.75  He quoted
the second paragraph of the Declaration, emphasizing that consent
legitimizes power because it obligates government to recognize
unalienable rights—that is, unalienable individual rights, which are
the basis of the right of self-government.76
In a similar manner, Thomas Jefferson insisted again and again
“that the earth belongs . . . to the living”77 and, thus, that each genera-
tion has “a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes
most promotive of its own happiness.”78  Jefferson, though, also spoke
of natural rights as limiting what any generation acting as popular sov-
ereign can do.  And even when James Madison insisted that the peo-
ple are the best protectors of their rights, he denied any claim that the
“majority is the political standard of right and wrong.”79  Madison also
spoke of rights prior to and binding upon civil society.80  I do not wish
to labor over the intricacies of these thinkers, I merely suggest that
even in creating a constitutional order, they tended to draw on a com-
bination of popular sovereignty and natural rights, with the latter tem-
pering and limiting the reach of the former.  Thus popular
sovereignty, even outside the Constitution, existed within a founda-
tion and was distinct from popular will.
The notion of substantive limits on government is in contrast to
the insistence that rights can be structured in purely pragmatic and
procedural terms, or based on “authentic” acts of popular constitu-
tionalism.  As Cass Sunstein argues, because rights are secured by gov-
ernment—the result of legal rules—they can be reconstructed by the
government to meet the needs of history and democracy.81  To say
that rights are “constructed” would hardly come as a surprise to the
natural rights thinking of the Founders who insisted on precisely this
point.82  But they were constructed to comport with the fundamental
75. WILSON, supra note 74, at 62. R
76. Id.
77. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 THE FOUN-
DERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at 68 (emphasis omitted). R
78. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
79. James Madison, The Law of Nature and Majority Rule (1785), in SELECTED WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 27, 28 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006).
80. James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 79, at 21, 23. R
81. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 26–27 (2004).
82. See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC 234 (1996) (examining
how natural rights thinking pervaded and shaped the new republicanism of Jefferson and
Madison, situating natural rights as being prior to and the precondition of republican
government).
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nature of human beings, and government was legitimately constituted
to protect such rights.83  Thus the legal realist’s insistence was novel,
not in insisting that rights were constructs, but in insisting that be-
cause they were constructs we could adapt them to the needs of mod-
ern society.84  A similar sentiment finds expression in the popular
constitutionalism of Bruce Ackerman.85  Under such a theory, popu-
lar sovereignty, when authentically expressed, cannot be limited.  In
Rousseau’s words: “If, then, the people simply promises [sic] to obey,
it dissolves itself by that act and loses its character as a people; the
moment there is a master, there is no longer a sovereign, and forth-
with the body politic is destroyed.”86  Yet how do we know an “authen-
tic” act of popular will when we see it? Such vexing questions are at
the root of formalizing politics in a written constitution precisely so
that foundational questions do not turn on scrutinizing popular will.87
If we take the claims of History seriously, twenty-first century con-
stitutional development may require a virtually unchecked executive
to protect and preserve our nation, which might entail a radical re-
construction of liberty.88  It was, after all, Woodrow Wilson who in-
sisted on expansive executive power as a means of overcoming
constitutional checks in administering the will of the people.89  In
drawing out the popular potential of the presidency, Wilson insisted
“[l]et him once win the admiration and confidence of the country,
and no other single force can withstand him . . . .  [H]e is irresisti-
ble . . . .”90  And it was progressives like Herbert Croly who rejected
the notion of separated power, insisting that “[a] thoroughly repre-
sentative government is essentially government by men rather than by
Law.”91  Indeed, Croly went so far as to argue that “the insertion of the
bill of rights in the Constitution contributed more than any other fea-
83. Id. at 233–34.
84. SUNSTEIN, supra note 81. R
85. Ackerman’s “dualist democracy” is rooted in unbound popular sovereignty. ACKER-
MAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 32–33.  In Transformations, Acker- R
man even calls the peoples’ voice “The Prophetic Voice.” ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, at 3. R
86. ROUSSEAU, supra note 23, at 170. R
87. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
88. For an analysis of this position, see Gordon Silverstein, Constitutional Contortion?
Making Unfettered War Powers Compatible With Limited Government, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 349
(2005) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005)).
89. WILSON, supra note 1, at 68–71. R
90. Id. at 68.  Of course Wilson was resisted by Henry Cabot Lodge and the Senate.
STID, supra note 9, at 169. R
91. CROLY, supra note 2, at 274. R
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ture to convert it into a monarchy of the Law superior in right to the
monarchy of the people.”92
This sentiment also found expression in Rousseau’s eighteenth-
century democracy. In taking aim at separations in politics altogether,
Rousseau claimed that if sovereignty cannot be bound, neither can it
be divided:
But our politicians, being unable to divide sovereignty in its
principle, divide it in its object.  They divide it into force and
will, into legislative power and executive power; into rights of
taxation, of justice, and of war; into internal administration
and foreign relations—sometimes conflating all these
branches, and sometimes separating them.  They make the
sovereign into a fantastic being, formed of disparate parts; it
is as if they created a man from several different bodies, one
with eyes, another with arms, another with feet, and nothing
else.93
Given such an understanding, eighteenth-century constitutional-
ism may yet have something to teach us: maintaining some form of
the separations at heart of constitutional democracy may be more pru-
dent then ever.  As Montesquieu insisted in sketching the notion of a
separation of powers at the origins of modern constitutionalism, the
most important separation was not between the executive and the leg-
islature, but between both of these and the judiciary.94  And this was
of a judiciary that spoke to legal issues and not necessarily constitu-
tional questions.95  But we should think of such measures as precau-
tionary rather than guaranteed. Long ago, Alexander Hamilton
voiced concern over judges “embark[ing] in a conspiracy with the
legislature.”96
Furthermore, while small “d” democrats and progressives have
tended to focus on and criticize the formal separation of powers,
other separations that remain essential to liberal democracy may be
92. Id. at 55.
93. ROUSSEAU, supra note 23, at 171. R
94. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
1989) (stating that there will be no “liberty if the power of judging is not separate from
legislative power and from executive power”).
95. Id. at 163.
96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 85.  Lincoln saw R
the Dred Scott decision as part of just such a conspiracy.  The decision might well have been
grounded in the interests of a governing coalition, but that did not make it constitutionally
sound.  Indeed, it was all the worse, according to Lincoln, because the Court allowed itself
to be used by the likes of President Buchanan and Judge Douglas in an attempt to silence a
profound constitutional dispute.  Abraham Lincoln, The Dred Scott Decision (June 26,
1857), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 352 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
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even more important.  Even in parliamentary systems there is the sep-
aration between the majority and minority in parliament, as well as
the separation between government and society, public and private,
and church and state.97  All of these separations are at the heart of
eighteenth-century constitutional democracy even if they may take dif-
ferent forms in different polities.  History has not rendered these sep-
arations irrelevant.98
Turning to some of the most pressing political issues in the early
years of the twenty-first century might firm up our commitment to
such constitutional separations.  The division between the legislature
and executive may remain the most effective means of utilizing and
containing executive power, while a merger of legislative and execu-
tive powers may well increase the power of the executive.99  This could
also be true of a more “democratic” president insisting on popular will
as the proper foundation of power.  Or take gay marriage: returning
to a more robust view of federalism against the centralizing tendencies
of the twentieth century may well be the best way to deal with such
fraught political issues in an increasingly pluralistic society.100  This
increasingly pluralistic society might also need a secular constitutional
creed more than ever as a means of providing us with some founda-
tional unity.101
Against such notions of a national creed we also find the latest
manifestation of progressive History, as we are encouraged to adapt
our parochial Constitution to accord with the more cosmopolitan im-
peratives of global constitutionalism.102  Such imperatives fit, in part,
with the universal aspirations of eighteenth-century constitutionalism
97. PIERRE MANENT, A WORLD BEYOND POLITICS? A DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL STATE
10–20 (Marc LePain trans., 2006).
98. In Our Undemocratic Constitution, Levinson urges us to embrace many of these sepa-
rations even while insisting on a more direct and nationalist view of democracy. See gener-
ally LEVINSON, supra note 10. R
99. Wilson’s popular view of the president as a means of overcoming the separation of
powers may well make for an extraordinarily powerful president limited only by popular
acceptance. WILSON, supra note 1, at 68; see also PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, supra note 36, at R
170–212 (discussing Wilson’s view of the presidency).
100. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL
IDENTITY 13 (2004) (noting that “subnational cultural and regional identities are taking
precedence over broader national identities” in the U.S., leading to a more fragmented,
pluralized society).
101. See Walter Berns, Constitutionalism and Multiculturalism, in MULTICULTURALISM AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 91, 108 (Arthur M. Melzer et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that a multicul-
turalist perspective fails to adequately recognize the foundational idea of liberty found in
the Constitution).
102. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 66 (2004) (discussing “judicial
globalization”).
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as evinced in modern rights conventions such as the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights.103  Yes, the language of “natural rights” is
absent, or obscured, but such universal rights are difficult to think of
in any other terms.104  We might look at what is permanent about con-
stitutionalism, and “The Permeability of Constitutional Borders.”105
This might also move us to be more attentive to the different forms
constitutional democracy may take in different places—something of
which eighteenth-century constitutional thinkers were acutely aware.
As Alexander Hamilton put it in the last paper of The Federalist, openly
acknowledging that the Constitution came from imperfect hands
under imperfect circumstances: “I am persuaded that it is the best
which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and su-
perior to any the revolution has produced.”106  Thus, Hamilton cap-
tured the peculiar nature of modern constitution making at its birth.
Modern constitutionalism is a self-consciously reasoned attempt to
bring a polity into being.107  And yet, in doing so, a constitution must
accommodate the particular people it is created for, bending here
and there to their habits, opinions, and circumstances—that is to say,
to accident if not force.  In just this manner, a constitution may em-
brace universal principles, but it does so for a particular people, mark-
ing its boundaries by way of the people, even while attempting to
cultivate and sustain that people’s attachment to the constitution.
As theorists of eighteenth-century constitutionalism like Montes-
quieu and Madison argued, it may be that a constitution of our own
remains the best method of protecting and fostering such rights and
values.108  But we should not fear to follow Professor Levinson in ask-
103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
104. For example, the preamble reads: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” which bears a striking resemblance to the
Declaration of Independence’s natural rights. Id.  This does not mean, however, that the
U.S. should engage in a crusade for such principles abroad.
105. See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1763 (2004), for such a discussion.
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 491. R
107. Id. NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
108. As Montesquieu argued, “In addition to the right of nations, which concerns all
societies, there is a political right for each one.  A society could not continue to exist with-
out a government.  ‘The union of all individual strengths,’ as Gravina aptly says, ‘forms
what is called the political state.’ . . .  It is better to say that the government most in con-
formity with nature is the one whose particular arrangement best relates to the disposition
of the people for whom it is established.” MONTESQUIEU, supra note 94, at 8 (emphasis R
omitted); see also James Madison, Universal Peace (1792), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 88 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
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ing whether or not our Constitution serves these purposes.109  Indeed,
if we take The Federalist seriously, whether our experiment has been
successful may be considered an open question.  It has most certainly
been an imperfect experiment—a lesson that eighteenth-century con-
stitutional thinkers insisted upon from the beginning.110  And yet our
Constitution has been successful enough that while some change is
inevitable, we should not alter it for light or transient causes.  More to
the point, much of what we want to keep in our Constitution—what
remains best about it after two hundred years—is traced to its eight-
eenth-century origins.
109. LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 3–9. R
110. See, for example, this explicit argument in THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 12. R
